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Abstract
Social responsibility links personal behavior with societal expectations and plays a key role in affecting an agent’s
emotional state following a decision. However, the neural basis of responsibility attribution remains unclear. In two
previous event-related brain potential (ERP) studies we found that personal responsibility modulated outcome
evaluation in gambling tasks. Here we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to identify
particular brain regions that mediate responsibility attribution. In a context involving team cooperation, participants
completed a task with their teammates and on each trial received feedback about team success and individual
success sequentially. We found that brain activity differed between conditions involving team success vs. team
failure. Further, different brain regions were associated with reinforcement of behavior by social praise vs. monetary
reward. Specifically, right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) was associated with social pride whereas dorsal striatum
and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were related to reinforcement of behaviors leading to personal gain. The
present study provides evidence that the RTPJ is an important region for determining whether self-generated
behaviors are deserving of praise in a social context.
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Introduction
Actions are guided by a sense of personal responsibility that
follows moral principles [1]. Responsibility attribution --
determining who is responsible for what outcomes -- underlies
this process and is fundamental to the allocation of social
resources. For example, people who feel guilty for bad
behavior might alter their behavior in the future. Recently,
neuroscientists have become greatly interested in exploring the
neural basis of social cognition and moral judgement [2,3].
However, the neural basis of social responsibility attribution
has yet to be well explored.
Schlenker and colleagues defined responsibility as a
psychological adhesive that connects an actor to an event in
accord with behavioral prescriptions [4]. They constructed a
triangle model of responsibility containing three elements:
prescriptions, events and identity. Prescriptions refer to general
codes or rules for conduct, that is, the rules that the actor
should follow in any particular situation (e.g., “students should
not make noise in class” versus “construction workers are
allowed to make noise”). Events constitute the actions
themselves together with their consequences (e.g., “Making
noise in class is disruptive to the professor’s lecture” versus
“asking good questions in class can be helpful to everyone”)
and identity refers to the actor’s roles and commitments (e.g.,
“The person who made noise is a student enrolled in the class”
versus “The person who made noise is a construction worker
outside”). Schlenker and colleagues proposed that the sense of
responsibility (responsibility sense) depends on the strengths
of three linkages between each two of the three elements and,
prior to performing an action, affects the actor’s determination
to achieve the associated goal.
Social psychologists since Heider (1958) have investigated
how people attribute responsibility [5]. Typically, attributions are
coloured by a self-serving bias: individuals attribute positive
outcomes to their own actions and explain away negative
outcomes to external factors or other people [6,7]. The self-
serving bias appears to enhance self-esteem [4]. Weiner
(1985) suggested a theoretical framework for understanding
attribution in which “cognitions of increasing complexity”
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sequentially induce corresponding emotional processes [8].
Specifically, he suggested that following an outcome to a
behavior, people experience emotions based on the success or
failure of the outcome, such as happiness or sadness, that are
independent of the source of the behavior. Immediately after
this, they experience a different set of emotions based on their
attribution of the source of the behavior, such as guilt and
pride. To be clear, here we define responsibility sense as an
actor’s perceived degree of responsibility before and during an
action and responsibility attribution as their feelings of guilt or
pride subsequent to the action.
Many studies have demonstrated that responsibility sense
dramatically modulates emotional states following decisions,
for example, feelings of regret or disappointment [9]. We have
also confirmed this finding in previous ERP studies. In one
study, responsibility sense was manipulated according to
whether participants worked as individuals within a group or on
behalf of the whole group [10]. Participants reported higher
responsibility sense when working individually than with other
teammates. Further, neural activity associated with outcome
evaluation, as indexed by a component of the event-related
brain potential (ERP) called the feedback error related
negativity (fERN), was greater in a high- relative to a low-
responsibility condition. In addition, fERN amplitude was
significantly correlated with subjective ratings of responsibility
but not with subjective ratings of happiness. These results were
supported by another study that investigated how participants’
responsibility sense was affected by their subjective sense of
control over a gambling task [11].
The reinforcement learning theory of the fERN suggests that
this outcome evaluation process is mediated by brain areas
that support reinforcement learning, such as the basal ganglia,
ACC, and other motor-related neural areas [12]. An interesting
question concerns whether this neural network for
reinforcement learning is in fact modulated by responsibility
sense as suggested by the ERP studies. Several fMRI
experiments have demonstrated that responsibility sense
affects the BOLD signal of brain regions involved in reward
processing as observed in a regret-based decision making
task. For example, in a “wheel of fortune” gambling task,
Coricelli and colleagues found that the sense of personal
responsibility influenced outcome evaluation by showing that
feedback in a condition involving a sense of agency aroused
stronger activation in ventral striatum than feedback in a
condition that did not involve a sense of agency [13].
Subsequent studies also revealed that reward regions,
especially in the striatum, that responded differentially to win
and loss were also modulated by personal responsibility
[14,15]. Additionally, a recent study demonstrated an enhanced
amygdale response to regret-related outcomes when these
outcomes were associated with individual responsibility [16].
These studies provided strong evidence that responsibility
sense modulates reward processing in decision making tasks.
However, because reward-related factors were confounded
with responsibility in these experiments, responsibility
attribution could not be examined.
In contrast to the many studies on responsibility sense, only
a few studies have examined the neural basis of responsibility
attribution. Blackwood et al. conducted an fMRI study to
explore the neural basis of responsibility attribution and the
self-serving bias in attributional decision tasks [17]. Participants
were asked to read and vividly imagine specific events as
happening to them, and then to attribute the cause of those
events. For example, participants were asked to indicate
whether the sentence “A friend bought you a present” was
about them, their friend, or the situation itself. They found that
the dorsal striatal activity was modulated by a self-serving bias
(in which relatively more positive than negative events were
self-attributed) whereas brain areas subserving action-
simulation—including bilateral premotor cortex and the
cerebellum--were modulated by attributions of self-
responsibility (in which relatively more negative than positive
events were self-attributed). This study thus revealed that
different parts of the brain subserve the self-serving bias and
self-responsibility. Note that this decision making task
depended on mental simulation of observed (as opposed to
self-generated) behaviors. More recently, Young and
colleagues asked participants to judge the behaviors of the
protagonists in various stories. They predicted that brain
regions related to theory of mind (ToM) would also be involved
in moral evaluation and found that RTPJ was selectively
activated by negative moral judgements [18-20].
All of the above studies have investigated responsibility
attribution and moral judgement from the perspective of an
independent observer. However, actors vs. observers can
attribute social events to different causes because of cognitive
and motivational biases [21,22]. Therefore, neural processes
underlying responsibility attribution may differ for self-
generated vs. externally-generated behaviors.
Here we investigated responsibility attribution in a decision
making task that separated cognitive processes involved with
attribution from processes involved in outcome evaluation.
Specifically, in the present study we conducted an fMRI
experiment that required participants to cooperate in the task
as part of a team and that sequentially presented team
outcomes (team feedback) followed by individual outcomes
(individual feedback). Our study differs from previous research
in two important respects. First, we focused on self-generated
behaviors rather than observed behaviors. In other words,
responsibility attribution in the present experiment was from a
first-person view rather than from a third-person view. Second,
we focused on responsibility attribution to feedback while
controlling for the effect of the feedback on reward processing.
This allowed us to dissociate responsibility attribution from
reward processing of monetary outcomes, which would not
have been possible if information related to responsibility and
reward were delivered simultaneously. According to Weiner’
theoretical framework, in the present study when participants
receive individual performance feedback they should attribute
the source of the outcome differently depending on the context,
namely, whether the team won or lost [8]. To be clear, we call
the attribution-dependent emotion guilt when the team outcome
was negative and pride when the team outcome was positive
(Figure 1).
A previous study demonstrated that the “self system” is
engaged in responsibility processing and that social context
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influences this process [4]. It has also been shown that
difficulties in attributing responsibility and in experiencing pride
were observed in autism, which is associated with ToM
impairments [23,24]. Therefore, we predicted that neural
mechanisms implementing responsibility attribution might
overlap with brain regions subserving self-referential processes
and ToM, such as MFC, TPJ and precenues [3,25-29].
Moreover, because individual feedback in our study also
provided information necessary for error monitoring, we
predicted that the reinforcement learning system, including
parts of the basal ganglia, ACC and other motor areas, might
also be activated in this task.
Methods
Participants
Eighteen healthy volunteers (6 males; mean age=21.1 years,
Standard Deviation, SD=1.1 years) participated in the current
study. All of the subjects were right-handed with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. Three of them were excluded from
data analysis because of head movement during scanning (one
participant) or because they were categorized as an outlier
because the number of error trials was more than two SDs
from the mean (one participants)[30]. An additional participant
was categorized as an outlier because self-reports of pride
were more than two SDs below the mean. Thus fifteen subjects
were included in the final analysis. This study has been
approved by the IRB at Southwest University. We had obtained
appropriate ethics committee approval for the research
reported, and all subjects gave written informed consent in our
experiment.
Stimuli and task design
This experiment consisted of two sessions, a pre-scan
behavioral test session and an fMRI scan session the following
day. For session one, participants were required to engage in a
standard time estimation task in which the time window
changed according to participants’ accuracy; the task is
designed such that the feedback depends on performance and
yet results in 50% correct feedback [31]. Participants were told
that the aim of this session was to test their time estimation
ability and that they would be assigned to a two-person team
with another stranger who had the same level of time
estimation ability. The following day, they finished a team
cooperation task with their partners (who were actually
confederates of the investigator) in the fMRI experiment. Note
that the real participants were always assigned to play the
game in the fMRI scanner.
For the fMRI session, at the beginning of each trial of the
time estimation task a black fixation cross appeared on a gray
background (1500 ms) and then turned red (500 ms) (Figure
1a), serving as a warning stimulus. Afterwards, the word “Go!”
appeared on the screen (2000 ms maximum). The participants
were told to press a button when they believed that 1000 ms
had elapsed since stimulus onset, after which the “Go!” sign
disappeared, resulting in a blank screen of random duration;
the total duration of the “Go!” stimulus and the blank screen
was fixed at random, integral multiples of the TR (i.e., 2000 ms,
4000 ms, and 6000 ms). Then, a “team feedback” stimulus
appeared (2000 ms), indicating whether the team won or lost,
represented by a smiling face and crying face, respectively,
followed by another blank screen with random duration (2000
ms, 4000 ms, 6000 ms). Finally, “individual feedback”
appeared (2000 ms), whereby information about the
participant’s own performance and his/her partner’s
performance was displayed under the words “You” and “Other”,
respectively. A cross in a circle indicated poor performance and
a check mark in a circle indicated good performance.
Participants were told that team success depended on the
average performance of their own reaction time (RTself) and
their partner’s RT (RTother) according to the following rule: RT
for team (RTteam)=(|RTself-1s|+ |RTother-1s|)/2. Thus, if the
average RT was within the time window from 0 to 100 ms then
Figure 1.  Illustration of the experimental task (a) and experimental design matrix (b).  See text for details.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.g001
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the team won, otherwise, they lost. In fact, unknown to
participants the team feedback was pseudo-randomly
generated such that it indicated success on half of the trials
and failure on the other half. However, for trials with RTs longer
than 1800 ms or shorter than 400 ms, team feedback was
always negative and individual feedback always indicated guilt,
so as to make the feedback seem believable for extreme
errors. All stimuli appeared in the center of the screen and
were approximately 5 degrees of angle.
According to our hypothesis, participants would attribute
responsibility differently in accordance with team and individual
feedback. The two feedback conditions together describe six
conditions: high guilt (HG: the team failed because of the
participant’s own bad performance), medium guilt (MG: the
team failed because both members performed badly), low guilt
(LG: the team failed because of the partner’s bad
performance), high pride (HP: the team succeeded because of
the participant’s own good performance), medium pride (MP:
the team succeeded because both players performed well),
and low pride (LP: the team succeeded because of the
partner’s good performance) (see Figure 1b). The experiment
was divided into four runs. In total, there were 108 trials for
each condition of team feedback (team won vs. lost) and 36
trials for each of the six combinations of individual and team
feedback.
After participants finished the experiment they were asked to
finish a questionnaire consisting of three parts. In the first part,
they had to complete a 9-point questionnaire to rate their
degree of happiness when they faced two different situations of
team feedback and six situations of individual feedback. Also,
they were required to rate their feeling of responsibility (pride
and guilt) in relation to different types of individual feedback. “1”
indicated very low pride or guilt when the question was related
to responsibility attribution and indicated very unhappy when
the question related to happiness. Conversely, “9” indicated
very high pride/guilt and very happy, respectively. In the
second part of the questionnaire they were presented with the
following forced-choice question: “Which is more important for
you, the success of your team or your own performance?” The
third part contains eight questions from the subscale
“dutifulness” of big five questionnaire. Since no significant
result was found with regard to the score of “dutifulness”, the
data of third part will no longer be discussed in the rest of this
paper.
Image acquisition
Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signals were
measured using a 3.0 T Siemens MAGNETOM Trio scanner
(Allegra; Erlangen, Germany) with a 12-channel head coil.
Functional MRI data were acquired in four separate runs using
a T 2-sensitive gradient echo planar imaging sequence
covering the whole-brain (32 slices, slice-thickness 3.0 mm,
Repetition Time (TR)= 2000 ms; Echo Time (TE)=29 ms, ﬁeld
of view (FoV): 220 mm2, matrix size: 64 × 64. An anatomical 3D
dataset consisting of 176 slices was acquired between the
second run and the third run (MDEFT sequence (Deichmann et
al., 2004); TR= 1900 ms; TE =2.52 ms; Flip Angle=9°, voxel
dimensions=1×1×1 mm3; FoV=250 mm2).
Behavioral data analysis
Unlike the standard 1 s time-estimation task [31], in the fMRI
component of the present study all of the feedback stimuli were
presented pseudo-randomly. Therefore, participant accuracy
was not meaningful in this experiment. Nevertheless,
participants could modify their behavior on a given trial based
on feedback received on previous trials. For this reason, we
calculated the absolute value of difference in RT between
consecutive trials (△RT) as a measure of error correction. In
addition, correlation analyses were conducted among
responsibility scores, happiness scores and △RT values. All
the r-values reported here reflect Pearson correlation values.
fMRI data analysis
Imaging data were analysed using BrainVoyager QX (Brain
Innovation, Maastricht, the Netherlands). Functional data were
preprocessed to correct for slice scan time differences (using
sinc interpolation), 3D motion artifacts (Trileaner sinc
interpolation), linear drifts, and low-frequency non-linear drifts
(high pass filter less than 2 cycles/time course). Functional
data were then co-registered with the anatomical volume and
transferred into standard stereotaxic space using Talairach
normalization [32] and spatially smoothed with a 4 mm full
width at half maximum Gaussian kernel.
The statistical analyses were carried out using a voxel-wise
General Linear Model (GLM) at the single subject level, based
on design matrices that included the estimated 3D motion
parameters obtained during pre-processing as well as
predictors for all relevant task conditions (two events of team
feedback, six events of individual feedback and the “Go!”
stimulus). The reported group analyses were conducted using
a random effects model. Note that only the time periods
associated with team feedback and individual feedback were of
interest. The analyzed time window of each event was 2s. And
the box-car regressor of feedback stimulus was calculated
throughout the entire duration of feedback presentation. The
time of box-car regressors of all conditions were the same. The
two conditions of team feedback (team loss and team gain)
were submitted to a T-test, and the three pride conditions and
three guilt conditions were submitted to ANCOVA analysis in
Brain Voyager separately. The statistical group maps
representing significant results were corrected for multiple
comparisons using the false-discovery rate (q <.05, FDR) with
10 continuous voxels [33].
As an exploratory analysis, regions of interest (ROIs) were
created based on the significant clusters of activation identified
in voxelwise analyses of group level for the main effects of
pride and guilt attribution (see results). The ROI was defined
for each subject based on the peak coordinates of the results
from the group level. Then, ROI analyses were performed by
extracting parameter estimates (betas) from the GLM model
and averaging across all voxels in the cluster for each subject.
These beta values were further subjected to correlation
analyses between the BOLD and behavioral data. For the pride
and guilt conditions separately, correlations were performed
across the three sub-conditions (high, medium, low) between
the BOLD signal and △RT. We also computed differences in
behavioral data (separately for RT, happiness scores and
Neural Basis of Responsibility Attribution
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responsibility scores) between pairs of individual feedback
conditions (e.g., HP and MP), and correlated these values with




Because the △ RT values are related to performance
monitoring and error correction, these △ RT data were entered
into a three (responsibility level: high, middle, low) by two
(valence: guilt and pride) repeated measure analyses of
variance (ANOVA). The results revealed a main effect of
valence, F (1, 14) =16.23, p =.001 (Figure 2). The △ RT was
larger after the team lost feedback (i.e., guilt condition: 168±57
ms) than that after team won feedback (i.e., pride condition:
148±49 ms), indicating that participant changed their time
estimate more following monetary losses than monetary gains.
There was no main effect of responsibility, F (2, 28) <1, p =.47,
and no significant interaction between valence and
responsibility, F (2, 28) =3.46, p >.05.
Given that people could attribute the source of the outcome
differently following positive vs. negative team outcomes—that
is, they could show a self-serving bias [34,35] --the BOLD
signal of responsibility attribution and subjective rating scores
were analyzed separately for the pride and guilt conditions
(Figure 2a). First the subjective rating scores of pride in the
pride conditions were submitted to a one-factor repeated
measures ANOVA with three levels (HP, MP and LP). The
ANOVA revealed a main effect of pride, F (2, 28) =36.94, p <.
001. Follow-up T-tests revealed higher reported pride in the MP
condition (7.7± 1.5) compared to the HP condition (6.9±1.6),
t(14)=2.26, p <.05, and higher reported pride in the HP
condition compared to the LP condition (3.7±1.2), t(14)=6.18, p
<.001. Second, the subjective rating scores of guilt in guilt
conditions were submitted to a one factor repeated-measures
ANOVA with three levels of guilt (HG, MG, and LG). The main
effect of guilt was significant, F (2, 28) =4.31, p <.05.
Participants felt more guilt in the HG condition (6.6±2.1)
compared to the MG condition (5.2±1.7), t(14)=2.77, p <.05,
and more guilt in the HG condition compared to the LG
condition (4.9±1.4), t(14)=2.39, p <.05. Guilt was not
significantly different between the MG and LG conditions,
t(14)=0.61, p >.05.
Afterwards, the subjective rating scores of happiness in the
pride condition were submitted to a one-factor repeated
measures ANOVA with three levels of pride (HP, MP and LP),
revealing a main effect of happiness, F (2, 20) =45.1, p <.001
(Figure 2b). Pairwise comparison revealed significant
differences between each level of pride. As illustrated in Figure
2, people reported more happiness in the MP condition
(8.7±0.6) than in the HP condition (7.6±1.4), t(14)=3.38, p =.
005. Happiness scores were also higher in the HP condition
than in the LP condition (4.7±2.1), t(14)=7.37, p <.001.
Likewise, the subjective rating scores of happiness in the guilt
condition were submitted to a one-factor repeated measures
ANOVA with three levels (HG, MG and LG), revealing a main
effect of happiness, F (2, 28) =16.57, p <.001. Pairwise
comparison showed that participants reported greater
happiness in the LG condition (5.0±1.7) than in the HG
condition [2.8±1.5, t (14) =4.68, p <.001] and than in the MG
condition [2.8±1.3, t(14)=4.32, p =.001]. No difference was
found between the HG condition and the MG condition, p >.05.
In addition, twelve out of fifteen subjects reported that team
success was more important to them than their own success.
A subsequent correlation analysis revealed that pride was
significantly correlated with happiness in the pride condition, r
=0.72, p <.001. By contrast, guilt was significantly negatively
correlated with happiness in the guilt condition, r = -0.30, p <.
05. No significant correlations were found between the △ RT
values and subjective rating of happiness and responsibility in
both conditions (all p >.05).
fMRI data
Team feedback.  As indicated in Table 1 and Figure 3, a
whole brain random effects analysis comparing the team win
condition with the team lose condition revealed activation in the
bilateral dorsal striatum only: Positive feedback induced greater
activity than did negative feedback, consistent with previous
Figure 2.  Behavioral data: the mean value of subjective rating scores of responsibility sense (pride and guilt, panel a),
happiness (panel b) and △ RT (panel c).  Error bars indicate +1 sem.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.g002
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research [36,37]. This result confirmed the validity of the
present manipulation. Because the team feedback is not the
event of main interest, these results will not be further
discussed.
Individual feedback.  A one way ANOVA with three levels
(HP, MP, and LP) on the BOLD signal associated with the pride
condition revealed several brain regions that were differentially
sensitive to the level of pride, including the frontal eye field
(FEF), ACC and dorsal striatum, RTPJ, inferior temporal gyrus,
occipital cortex, and others (Table 2). We focused our analyses
on dorsal striatum and dACC because of their demonstrated
involvement in RL [12] and, as exploratory analyses, on the
FEF and RTPJ because the BOLD responses in these brain
areas were correlated with our behavioral measures. Figure 4
presents statistical maps and mean beta values for these
regions: RTPJ, FEF, dorsal striatum and dACC. Post-hoc t-
tests revealed different patterns of activation among the
different regions, as indicated in Table 2.
A three-level ANOVA (HG, MG, LG) on the BOLD response
associated with the guilt condition revealed only a few clusters
sensitive to guilt attribution in a whole brain random analysis,
including caudate, bilateral cerebellum and occipital cortex as
listed in Table 3 (Figure 5). Associated beta values were
correlated with behavioral data across the three guilt conditions
(HG, MG, LG).
Correlation analysis between behavioral data and fMRI
data
To explore further the specific function of each brain region
that we found, separate correlation analyses were conducted
between the behavioral data (responsibility rating scores,
happiness scores and △ RT values) and the fMRI data. △ RT
and the FEF activation were correlated across the three pride
conditions (HP, MP and LP), r = 0.45, p <.005. There was also
significant positive correlations between △ RT values and
fusiform gyrus activation (r= 0.32, p <.04) and dorsal striatum
activation (r= 0.39, p <.01) in the guilt condition. However, the
subjective rating scores (guilt, pride, happiness) were not
correlated with the activations of any regions across these
conditions.
Although we assumed that these fMRI results reflect
responsibility attribution, it also possible that they are
associated with more general cognitive functions such as
performance monitoring (e.g., error detection and correction).
For example, brain region activations associated with high
pride might be due to the correctness of the participant’s
response rather than to responsibility per se. To examine this
possibility, we looked for brain areas sensitive to responsibility
attribution by controlling for individual participant performance.
Specifically, we contrasted the fMRI data associated with the
HP condition with that of the MP condition, thereby equating for
individual performance (because participants received positive
feedback for their responses in both of these conditions; Figure
1b). Behavioral data and fMRI beta values associated with the
MP condition were subtracted from those of the HP condition
and the difference values submitted to a correlation analysis.
The difference in pride was significantly correlated with the
difference in BOLD values between the conditions for the right
TPJ, r = 0.52, p <.05 (Figure 6): people who exhibited larger
differences in right TPJ activation between the HP and MP
conditions tended to report more pride in the HP condition
relative to the MP condition, whereas people who had
comparable activations between the HP and MP conditions
reported more pride in the MP condition relative to the HP
condition (Figure 6, left panel). As well, the difference in
activation associated with a region in the posterior cerebellum
Table 1. Brain areas showing greater activity for win team feedback than lose team feedback.
Brain area Hemisphere Talairach coordinate Effect size Voxels
  X Y Z t-value P-value  
Dorsal striatum Right 15 -1 -5 9.51 0.000001 51
Dorsal striatum Left -12 5 1 9.26 0.000001 37
The t-value, P-value and coordinate are from the peak voxel within each region of interest.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.t001
Figure 3.  Brain areas showing greater activity for win team feedback than lose team feedback (left pane) and associated
BOLD signal changes separately for left and right dorsal striatum (right pane).  Error bars indicate standard error.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.g003
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(Declive) was negative correlated with the difference in △RT, r
= -0.63, p <.02.
Analogous correlations were also carried out for the guilt
condition. First, difference values for behavioral data (guilt
scores, happiness scores and △RT values) and for the fMRI
data were obtained by subtracting these data in the MG
condition from the HG condition and submitting the difference
quantities to correlation analyses. No statistically significant
correlations were found.
Discussion
The main goal of the present study was to identify brain
areas underlying responsibility attribution by dissociating
responsibility attribution from outcome evaluation in a decision
making task. This dissociation is important because the
outcome—whether the team won or lost money--is normally
important to participants in such tasks, so presenting
information about outcome and attribution simultaneously
would confound one with the other. The behavioral results (guilt
and pride responsibility scores, happiness scores and △RT
values) indicated that this task did in fact arouse different
degrees of responsibility sense across the conditions.
Table 2. Brain regions sensitive to levels of pride in the pride condition.
Groups Brain area Hemisphere Talairach coordinate Effect size Voxels
   X Y Z F-value P-value  
HP=LP>MP RTPJ(40) R 51 -52 28 17.64 0.000011 25
 FEF(8) R 3 23 46 22.46 0.000002 86
HP>MP=LP MOG(18) R 21 -88 -5 30.11 0.000001 134
 Fusiform Gyrus (37) R 33 -46 -11 27.92 0.000001 47
 Thalamus R 15 -13 13 15.25 0.000033 12
 Caudate Head R 6 11 4 16.99 0.000015 30
 Posterior cerebellum (Declive) L -6 -64 -20 20.08 0.000004 39
 ACC(24) L -3 23 19 15.41 0.000031 11
 Lentiform Nucleus L -9 -1 4 17.15 0.000014 12
 PCC (30) L -18 -64 10 20.74 0.000003 32
 IOG (18) L -27 -88 -8 19.39 0.000005 23
HP>LP>MP MFG (9) R 39 26 25 15.99 0.000023 25
 SPL (7) R 30 -55 43 16.61 0.000018 11
 Precuneus (7) R 3 -58 43 15.57 0.000028 13
 Posterior cerebellum (Pyramis) L -24 -61 -29 18.61 0.000007 42
 Thalamus L -21 -22 -2 17.15 0.000014 16
 Fusiform Gyrus (37) L -39 -52 -11 25.79 0.000001 117
These regions were separated into three groups based on t-test results of beta values in each condition. “>”means significantly larger; “=”means not significantly different. T-
values, p-values and coordinates are associated with the peak voxel within each region of interest. Abbreviation: RTPJ, right Temporoparietal Junction; FEF, frontal eye
field; MOG, medial occipital gyrus; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; IOG, inferior occipital gyrus.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.t002
Figure 4.  Brain areas sensitive to level of pride in the pride condition and corresponding BOLD signal changes within
these regions.  Error bars indicate standard error.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.g004
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Interestingly, the post-experiment debriefing did not reveal any
evidence of a self-serving bias and participants even exhibited
a contrary trend: they felt greater guilt when they performed
poorly and their partners performed well and greater pride
when both players did well. Moreover, most participants
believed that team success was more important than their own
performance. These results might be surprising given that the
self-serving bias is commonly observed in such contexts.
However, previous studies have also shown that the self-
serving bias does not always occur in all experimental
paradigms, suggesting that this phenomenon is not universal
[34]. In the present context, the self-serving bias might not
have occurred because error admission did not incur any
additional costs due to the temporary nature of the team.
Further, the participants involved in this study were Chinese
natives, who are sometimes characterized as belonging to a
Table 3. Brain regions associated with the main effect of guilt.
Groups Brain area Hemisphere Talairach coordinate Effect size Voxels
   X Y Z F-value P-value  
MG>HG=LG Caudate Head L -18 23 4 24.88 0.000001 21
 MOG (19) R 30 -76 19 18.05 0.000009 47
MG>HG>LG Cuneus (17) R 12 -97 1 31.53 0.000001 10
 Fusiform Gyrus (37) R 42 -40 -5 16.56 0.000018 11
 Parahippocampal Gyrus (30) R 15 -40 -5 17.39 0.000012 21
 Cuneus (17) L -21 -94 1 54.94 0.000001 670
These regions were separated into two groups according to t-test results on the beta values for each condition. “>”means significantly larger; “=”means not significantly
different between. The t-values, p-values and coordinates are from the peak voxel within each region of interest.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.t003
Figure 5.  Brain regions associated with the effect of guilt.  Error bars indicate standard error. Abbreviation: DS , dorsal
striatum ;PG ,parahippocampal gyrus.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.g005
Figure 6.  Scatter plots showing correlations between behavioral data and fMRI beta values.  Left panel: the difference in
subjective ratings of pride (X axis) and the difference in BOLD signal activation in RTPJ (Y axis) between the HP and MP conditions.
Right panel: the difference in △ RT (X axis) and the difference in BOLD signal activation in posterior cerebellum (Y axis) between
the HP and MP conditions.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080389.g006
Neural Basis of Responsibility Attribution
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e80389
collectivistic culture: our participants may have exhibited less of
a self-serving bias compared to those in more individualistic
societies because in China people are primarily identified as
group members and are strongly motivated to behave
according to group norms [38].
Consistent with the behavioral data showing differential
trends for reported guilt and pride (participants reported the
most pride in the MP condition and the most guilt in the HG
condition), the individual feedback stimuli also differentially
activated several brain areas across the guilt and pride
conditions. Perhaps surprisingly, more regions were activated
in the pride condition relative to the guilt condition, suggesting
that participants might have been relatively more sensitive to
pride than to guilt. The differing valence of the reward
information provided by the team feedback might have elicited
differing degrees of motivation to process the individual
feedback and adjust their behavior accordingly. In other words,
participants may not have cared about their performance when
the team lost.
In the pride condition, several clusters of activation were
found with a whole brain random effects analysis. Our
behavioral data provide some insight into the functions of these
regions as they relate to the present study. First, FEF activation
was associated with △ RT: higher FEF activation predicted
larger changes in response time following errors. Further, the
FEF activations were significant stronger in the HP condition
(when the partner committed the error) and LP condition (when
the participant committed the error) than in the MP condition
(when both team members performed correctly), but did not
differ between the HP and LP conditions. These results
suggest that when the participant’s partner apparently caused
the team to fail, FEF activity predicted the participant’s change
in RT on the following trial despite having performed the task
successfully on the present trial. These finding are consistent
with many previous imaging studies that show that FEF
activities are responsible for attention and response selection
[39]. The present study extended this finding by showing that
FEF activation was not only sensitive to one’s own error but
also his or her partner’s error.
More importantly, when compared across the HP and the MP
conditions, RTPJ activation was inversely correlated with
participants’ pride, and in fact was the only brain region
correlated with this rating. Therefore, we inferred that the RTPJ
was important for social pride attribution in the present study.
This finding is consistent with many previous studies that
showed that RTPJ is an important region for processing ToM
[40,41]. In the present study, participants worked as part of a
team and thus their performance affected their partner’s
results. For this reason it seems reasonable to suggest that the
RTPJ might have contributed to responsibility attribution by
mentalizing partner thinking about the current results.
This finding raises the question of the specific contribution of
RTPJ to social moral processing. Young and her colleagues
have found that the RTPJ is an important region for moral
judgement [18,19]. More specifically, in an fMRI study, they
asked participants to determine, from a third-person viewpoint,
the amount of guilt attributable to different protagonists in
various scenarios. They found that the RTPJ response was
stronger to stories describing attempted harm by the
protagonists when the protagonists believed that their action
would cause harm to a second party compared to when they
believed that their actions would not cause such harm,
irrespective of whether the harm did or did not in fact occur
[18]. Further, when RTPJ function was disrupted with TMS,
participants tended to judge attempted harm as less morally
reprehensible [19]. These studies demonstrated that the RTPJ
not only plays a general role in belief attribution but is also
sensitive to moral valence. More recently, Young and
colleagues compared different ToM network activations when
participants made judgements of guilt and pride. Their results
showed that the RTPJ was less activated when participant
judged the behavior of protagonists as praise-worthy [20]. The
present results are consistent with this interpretation and
extend the previous findings by showing that RTPJ also plays
an important role in pride attribution from a first-person view.
To be specific, the RTPJ was more strongly activated when
either the participant or their partner didn’t finish the task very
well despite the team winning overall. This observation
suggests that RTPJ activation is not only inversely related to
pride in one’s own behavior but also, in a cooperative context,
to pride in a partner’s behavior. The fact that RTPJ activation
did not clearly differentiate between the HP and LP conditions,
in contrast to the post-experiment rating scores, might be
because the RTPJ functions in a binary manner.
Of potential concern is that the RTPJ activation could reflect
task-related motor activity because the activation pattern
across conditions was similar to that of the FEF. However,
previous researchers have suggested that the FEF and RTPJ
belong to separate attention-related networks: FEF is located in
a dorsal attention system while the RTPJ comprises one part of
a ventral attention network [39]. Additionally, Mars and
colleagues recently adopted diffusion-weighted imaging
tractrography--based parcellation approach and identified 3
separate regions in TPJ [42]. Then the following resting-state
functional connectivity analysis showed that the posterior TPJ,
which is very close to the TPJ cluster found in the present
study, was coupled to the areas which associated with social
cognition and the default network but not the ventral attentional
network. Moreover, in the present study, unlike FEF activation,
RTPJ activation was not correlated with △ RT values.
Furthermore, the correlation between the RTPJ activations and
pride scores was conducted on the difference in brain
activations and on the difference in pride ratings between the
HP and MP conditions, which should control for any effects of
error processing because participant performance was equated
across these two conditions. Lastly, in the MP condition FEF
activation was not observed whereas RTPJ was more activated
relative to baseline, suggesting that these two regions might
subserve different functions.
ACC and dorsal striatum exhibited more activation in the HP
condition relative to the other two win conditions and dorsal
striatum exhibited more activation in the MG condition relative
to the other two lose conditions. These regions are critical for
reinforcement learning [12,43-45]. Electrophysiological
evidence suggests that this outcome evaluation system may
operate in a binary manner, such that individual outcomes
Neural Basis of Responsibility Attribution
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indicate that a goal has either been achieved or not [37,46,47].
In the present study, we suggest that this reinforcement
learning system, especially the dorsal striatum, implemented a
reinforcement learning process. On win trials, participants
evidently viewed the high pride condition as the best outcome
because on these trials they took personal credit for the win. By
contrast, it is less clear why dorsal striatum was more activated
by shared guilt on lose trials. We speculate that participants
preferred to share the guilt (MG) rather than attribute all of the
guilt to an individual—whether to themselves (HG) or to their
partner (LG). In other words, the dorsal striatum might be
responsible for the self-serving bias, consistent with the
findings of a previous study [17]. Taken together, these results
suggest that people view the HP condition as the optimal
outcome on win trials, as reflected by the ACC and dorsal
striatum activation, and the MG condition as the optimal
outcome on lose trials, as reflected by the striatal activation. On
the other hand, this interpretation seems inconsistent with the
verbal reports of pride and guilt in these conditions: participants
reported the most happiness in the MP and LG conditions. We
suggest that the brain activations may reflect a relatively
automatic response to the reinforcing aspects of the outcomes,
whereas the verbal reports reflect a later phase of self-
evaluation that may be more susceptible to culturally biased
social expectations.
Despite exhibiting different patterns of activation across the
guilt and pride conditions, cerebellum and fusiform activities
were both correlated with △ RT values in the different
conditions: the BOLD signal of left fusiform gyrus was positively
correlated with △ RT values across the three sub-conditions in
the guilt condition, and the left Declive cerebellum was
negatively correlated with △ RT values when these values
were based on the difference between the HP and MP
conditions. Even though it is difficult to determine the precise
function of fusiform and cerebellum in the time estimation task
adopted here, we propose that these regions contributed to
processing visual and motor information for the task at hand.
In summary, we found that RTPJ activity was associated with
attributions of pride over one`s own behavior and a dACC and
dorsal striatum appear to be involved in reinforcing behaviors
associated with personal gain. In addition, the present study
raises an interesting question: did the participants lie to the
experimenter when they gave post-experiment ratings of pride?
If this is true, participants may have responded relatively
automatically to the reinforcing aspects of the outcomes, as
revealed by the BOLD signal, whereas reported their subjective
self-evaluations according to social expectations. Future
studies are needed to confirm the finding that social pride
attribution and self-serving bias might be mediated by different
neural systems. Moreover, this study failed to find brain regions
underlying guilt attribution. Thus, a novel task paradigm may be
necessary to activate brain systems involved in processing
feelings of guilt and pride simultaneously for a direct
comparison.
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